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VOLUME 52

SPMNG I 1967

NUMBER 4

THE SCIENTER FACTOR IN SECTIONS 8(a) (1)
AND (3) OF THE LABOR ACT: OF
BALANCING, HOSTILE MOTIVE,
DOGS AND TAILS*
Walter E. Oberert
In the lockout decisions of 1965, the Supreme Court equated sections
8(a) (1) and (3) with respect to the hostile-motive requirement. The author
examines the implications of this equation, contrasting the redundant role

played by section 8(a) (1) in the lockout cases, where the focus was properly upon 8(a) (3), with the independent role played by 8(a) (1) in other

cases. Where 8(a)(1) is merely the tail on the 8(a)(3) dog, the former
should follow the latter, he concludes, since the policies which dictate the
requirement of hostile motive in 8(a) (3) cases should apply equally to
8(a)(1) in its secondary, redundant role. But where 8(a)(1) is independently involved, different values are at stake and should lead to
different treatment.

THE PROBLEM OF REDUNDAwNY

Section 8 (a) (1) of the Labor-Management Relations Act provides that
it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
7 . . . . " In view of the encompassing nature of this protection, one
wonders at the function of the other four subdivisions of section 8(a),
* An abbreviated version of this paper was presented by the author at the Nineteenth
Annual Winter Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association in San Francisco
on December 28, 1966.
I Professor of Law and Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. The author
gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor Kurt L. Hanslowe of the Cornell Faculty
and of Randall M. Odza, a student at the Cornell Law School.
1 The Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1964), amending 49 Stat. 452 (1935), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in
section 8(a) (3).

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 52

which merely particularize some segment of the overall proscription contained in 8(a)(1).2 Conversely, one also wonders at the function of
8(a) (1) itself where it overlaps with 8(a) (2), (3), (4), or (5).
The occasion for this wonderment is rooted in the legislative history of
section 8(1) of the Wagner Act, the predecessor of section 8(a) (1). As
stated by Senator Wagner:
The first unfair labor practice in substance forbids an employer to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection.
This language follows practically verbatim the familiar principles already
embedded in our law by section 2 of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, section
2 of the Norris-La Guardia Act, section 77 (p) and (q) of the 1933 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, section 7 (a) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act, and section 7 (e) of the act creating the office of the Federal
Coordinator of Transportation.
Long experience has proved, however, that courts and administrative
agencies have difficulties in enforcing these general declarations of right in
the absence of greater statutory particularity.Therefore, without in any way
placing limitations upon the broadest reasonable interpretation of its
omnibus guaranty of freedom, the bill refers in greater detail to a few of
the practices which have proved the most fertile sources for evading or
obstructing the purpose of the law.3 [Emphasis added.]

The converse of the congressional concern over supporting the general
declaration of right with particularizations is stated elsewhere in the
legislative history:
Section 8(1): This is a blanket unfair labor practice, to protect the
rights cited in section 7 .... Such a general unfair practice is necessary,
since the courts may emasculate or construe very narrowly some one of the
following specific unfair practices. Furthermore, employers will doubtless
find methods of interference, etc., which are not specifically recited in the
other unfair practices, but are just as effective in impeding self-organization
2 The Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964), amending 49 Stat. 452-53 (1935), provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor or;
ganization or contribute financial or other support to it...
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization... ;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed
charges or given testimony under this Act;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a).
3 Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Committee on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13
(1935), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act 1935, at 2487
(1949) (published by the NLRB) [hereinafter cited as "Legislative History."].
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and collective bargaining. Thus, subdivisions (2), (3), and (4) and [sic]
are not exclusive, and, Jurthermore do not limit tke general scope of subdivision (1) .4 [Emphasis added.]
The concern of Congress to protect the unfair labor practice provisions

of the Wagner Act against emasculation by the courts may be better
understood if one recalls the judicial environment of the first three and a

half decades of this century. In the eyes of many members of Congress
in 1935, the courts had frustrated congressional intent in interpreting

enactments affecting organized labor. Thus, the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act of 1890' had been applied in highly questionable fashion to strike
and boycott activities of unions.' And when Congress sought to rectify
this judicial error in the Clayton Act of 1914,' hailed by Samuel Gompers
as labor's Magna Charta, the Supreme Court thwarted the legislative
purpose by interpreting sections 6 and 20 as merely codifying the common-law status quo." Indeed, the unfriendliness of the Supreme Court of

the mid-thirties to the will of Congress produced one of the gravest crises
the American constitutional experiment has yet known, culminating in the

ill-famed "Court-packing" plan of President Roosevelt.
What we have, then, in section 8(a) (1) is a blanket provision which
protects all of the employee rights of section 7 against everything which
the following four subdivisions of 8(a) more specifically protect against,
and, in addition, affords independent protection against employer offenses
not specifically covered by any of the other four subdivisions. When any
one of the other four subdivisions is violated, 8 (a) (1) is also violated; but
4 Comparison of S. 2926 (73d Cong., 2d Sess.) and S. 1958 (74th Cong., 1st Sess.):
Memorandum of March 11, 1935, prepared for Senate Committee on Education and Labor,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 Legislative History 1351-52.
The House Committee Report on the Wagner Act, though more briefly stated, is in substantial accord. It reads in pertinent part:
The succeeding unfair labor practices are intended to amplify and state more specifically certain types of interference and restraint that experience has proved require such
amplification and specification. These specific practices, as enumerated in subsections
(2), (3), (4), and (5), are not intended to limit in any way the interpretation of the
general provisions of subsection (1).
H.R. Rep. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1935), reprinted in 2 Legislative History 2924.
Similarly, the Senate Committee Report states:
The four succeeding unfair-labor practices are designed not to impose limitations or
restrictions upon the general guaranties of the first, but rather to spell out with particularity some of the practices that have been most prevalent and most troublesome.
S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1935), reprinted in 2 Legislative History 2309.

26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
6 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), was the first case in which the
held that the Sherman Act applied to combinations of workers. The case
Gregory, Labor and the Law 206-09 (2d rev. ed. 1958).
7 Clayton Act §§ 6, 20, 38 Stat. 731, 738 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964),
(1964).
8 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 US. 443 (1921), discussed in
note 6, at 162-72.
5

Supreme Court
is discussed in
29 U.S.C. § 52
Gregory, supra
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a violation of 8 (a) (1) does not necessarily entail a violation of any other
subdivision.
A moment's reflection will demonstrate the problem of redundancy
here. Either 8(a) (1) occupies the field, in which event, once its contours
are established, the other four subdivisions become irrelevant, or each of
the other four occupies its particular field, in which event 8(a)(1) becomes irrelevant in the areas of overlap. Neither of these alternatives has,
as yet, established supremacy. Instead, the NLRB and the courts have
rocked along in a kind of non-definitive approach to the line of demarcation between the blanket provision of 8 (a) (1) and the narrower ambit of
the other four subdivisions. For a dozen years or so after the Wagner Act
became law in 1935, there was no real problem of demarcation because
of the breadth of discretion accorded the Board by the courts in determining when an unfair labor practice had been committed by an employer.
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 was designed, however, to limit the Board's
discretion by broadening judicial review of its determinations? By a
process of natural development thereafter, the scope of 8(a) (1) has come
under a gradually increasing scrutiny. The problems inherent in a blanket
provision which covers all that particularized provisions cover, and then
some, have been brought into a sharpening focus.
II
THE CONFUSING LESSON OF THE LOCKOUT CASES

The focus has never been sharper than in the lockout cases, American
12
Ship Building'l and Brown Food," and the companion case, Darlington,
all three decided by the Supreme Court in March of 1965. In the lockout
cases, the Board's power under 8(a) (1) was equated in one very significant respect with its power under 8(a) (3). While this equation was not
explicitly stated by the Court, analysis of the opinions in the two cases
18
leads to this conclusion.
In American Ship Building, the employer had locked out its employees
for bargaining leverage after an impasse had been reached in negotiations
9 Compare Labor-Management Relations Act §§ 10(b), (c), (e), (f), 61 Stat. 146 (194-7),
29 U.S.C. §§ 160(b), (c), (e), (f) (1964), with National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, §§
10(b), (c), (e), (f), 49 Stat. 453 (1935). The most important change was in §§ 10(e) and
(f): "The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive." The italicized language was
added by Taft-Hartley. For a discussion of the effect of this change on judicial review, see
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
10 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
3" NLRB v. Brown (d/b/a Brown Food Store), 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
12 Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
13 See, e.g., Oberer, "Lockouts and the Law: The Impact of American Ship Building and
Brown Food," 51 Cornell L.Q. 193 (1966).
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for a contract renewal. In Brown Food, the nonstruck members of a
multiemployer bargaining unit had locked out their employees in response
to a whipsaw strike; when the struck employer hired temporary replacements, the locking-out employers did likewise. In both of these cases the
NLRB found violations of 8(a) (1) and (3).14 In both cases the Supreme
Court denied enforcement of the Board's orders.
The basis of the Court's action in each case was the same. Both 8(a) (1)
and (3) require, the Court indicated, a "hostile motive" on the employer's part for a violation to be found. Accordingly, there must be
affirmative evidence of such a motive except where the action of the employer is "inherently destructive of employee rights and is not justified by
the service of important business ends .... ."15 As more fully stated by Mr.
Justice Brennan in Brown Food:
We recognize that, analogous to the determination of unfair practices
under § 8(a) (1), when an employer practice is inherently destructive of
employee rights and is not justified by the service of important business
ends, no specific evidence of intent to discourage union membership is
necessary to establish a violation of § 8(a) (3). This principle, we have
said, is "but an application of the common-law rule that a man is held to
intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct."1 6
This hostile-motive requirement (sometimes described as "antiunion"
or "antistatutory") makes more sense as applied to 8(a) (3) than as
applied to 8(a) (1). As stated by Mr. Justice Brennan in Brown Food:
"We have determined that the 'real motive' of the employer in an alleged
§ 8(a) (3) violation is decisive ... 2" The necessity for this determination is explained by Mr. Justice Stewart in American Ship Building:
Section 8(a) (3) prohibits discrimination in regard to tenure or other
conditions of employment to discourage union membership. Under the
words of the statute there must be both discrimination and a resulting discouragement of union membership. It has long been established that a
finding of violation under this section will normally turn on the employer's motivation.... Thus when the employer discharges a union leader
who has broken shop rules, the problem posed is to determine whether the
employer has acted purely in disinterested defense of shop discipline or has
sought to damage employee organization. It is likely that the discharge
will naturally tend to discourage union membership in both cases, because
of the loss of union leadership and the employees' suspicion of the employer's true intention. But we have consistently construed the section to
leave unscathed a wide range of employer actions taken to serve legitimate
business interests in some significant fashion, even though the act committed may tend to discourage union membership.... Such a construction
14 American Ship Bldg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1963); John Brown (d/b/a Brown Food
Store), 137 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962).
15 NLRB v. Brown, supra note 11, at 287.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
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of § 8(a) (3) is essential if due protection is to be accorded the employer's
right to manage his enterprise.'
Both legislative history 9 and a substantial body of precedent20 support
this interpretation of 8(a) (3). The opposite is the case with respect to
8(a) (1). There is no necessity for reading a state-of-mind requirement
into 8 (a) (1). Its very purpose, as illuminated in the legislative history, is
to serve as a blanketing protection, reaching beyond the limitations of
8(a) (3) and the other 8(a) subdivisions. Put otherwise, the purpose of
8(a) (1) is to afford the Board a vehicle for dealing with employer practices which "interfere with, restrain, or coerce" employees in the exercise
of their statutory rights without running afoul of any of the other, more
particularized subdivisions of 8(a). It undercuts this purpose to saddle
8(a) (1) with a state-of-mind requirement appropriate for 8(a) (3). In
no case prior to American Ship Building and Brown Food has the Supreme
Court sought so clearly to engraft the hostile-motive requirement on section 8(a) (1). Indeed, in Burnup & Sims,"' a 1964 case in which the
employer discharged two union activists in the honestly mistaken belief
that they had threatened to dynamite his property if the union did not get
in, the Court expressly stated:
We find it unnecessary to reach the questions raised under § 8(a) (3)
for we are of the view that in the context of this record § 8(a) (1) was
plainly violated, whatever the employer's motive. Section 7 grants employees, inter alia, "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
action does not
labor organizations." Defeat of those rights by employer
22
necessarily depend on the existence of an anti-union bias.
The lockout cases demonstrate the dilemma confronting the Court in
dealing with section 8(a) (1) as it relates to section 8(a) (3). From the
standpoint of judicial review, an amorphously stated blanket provision is
an unhappy thing to have lying around. By definition its confines are less
sharply marked than those of narrower statutory standards. The tendency
is to deal with the narrower standard at the expense of the broader. In
cases of overlap between 8(a) (3) and 8(a) (1), the focus is typically on
8(a)(3). Where 8(a)(3) is found to have been violated, 8(a)(1) is
accorded perfunctory, derivative treatment. Even where 8 (a) (3) is found
not to have been violated, a tendency is discernible in some cases of over18 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965).

19 The legislative history of § 8(a) (3) is reviewed in Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 682-84 (1961) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan).
20 E.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937); Associated
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,
42-44 (1954); Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, supra note 19, at 674-77;
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1963).
21 NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964).
22 Id. at 22-23. [Footnote omitted.]
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lap to deny any independent force to 8(a) (1); since 8(a) (3) is not violated, neither is 8(a) (1).23 While this development is understandable and
even makes sense in cases of overlap, the danger inheres that the derivative content given to 8(a) (1) in such cases will qualify it even where
there is no overlap.
In this respect the scheme of the Wagner Act, unaltered by the TaftHartley amendments, leaves something to be desired. A blanket provision
particularized in narrower provisions but not delimited by them is a
legislative bull in a judicial china shop. Unless the particular controls the
general in the areas of overlap, the particular is read out of the statute. At
the same time, however, if the particular controls the general, the general
is, in areas of overlap, read out of the statute; it becomes, to that extent,
redundant.
The Supreme Court is very much aware of this dilemma even though it
has not seen fit as yet to admit the fact. In Darlington, for example,
decided at the same time as the lockout cases, Mr. Justice Harlan, writing
for the Court, sought to evade the sticky 8(a) (1) questions involved by
glibly treating the Board's disposition of the case as premised solely upon
8(a) (3). He stated:
Preliminarily it should be observed that both petitioners argue that the
Darlington closing violated § 8(a) (1) as well as § 8(a) (3) of the Act. We
think, however, that the Board was correct in treating the closing only
under § 8(a) (3).24
Accordingly, he limited his review of the case to an 8(a) (3) frame of
reference. Actually, the Board found the closing to violate both 8(a) (3)
and 8(a)(1), although the former received the focus of the Board's
attention. 5 Section 8(a)(3) had been more definitively defined by the
Board and the courts, however, so review on the 8(a) (3) basis was more
convenient.
Similarly, in Erie Resistor,2 6 the Court, Mr. Justice White writing,
found it convenient to deal with the question before it as one of "whether
an employer commits an unfair labor practice under § 8(a) ...when he
extends a 20-year seniority credit to strike replacements and strikers who
leave the strike and return to work.12 7 [Emphasis added.] Sections 8(a)
23 See, e.g., Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, supra note 19; Textile Workers
Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965); Getman, "Section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA
and the Effort To Insulate Free Employee Choice," 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 735, 758-59 (1965).
Burnup & Sims is an obvious departure from the pattern. It will be discussed in this regard

infra.

24 Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., supra note 23, at 268.
25 Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 252 (1962).
26 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
27 Id. at 221-22.
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(1) and (3) could thus be dealt with fungibly, again avoiding the sticky
questions presented by any differences in coverage between them.
These differences are substantial. Ignoring them does not make them
go away. On the contrary, the felt need to ignore them demonstrates their
importance. The importance of the differences is illustrated in the
Supreme Court's still viable precedents dealing with section 8(a) (1)
alone. Thus, in Republic Aviation28 and Babcock & Wilcox,2 9 the Court
recognized the necessity in 8(a) (1) cases for the Board to balance the
conflicting interests of the employees in their section 7 rights and of the
employer in his property rights. Hostile motive was not a required element
of the Board's finding of a violation of 8(a) (1). Burnup & Sims, as
already seen, constituted a 1964 nailing down of the Court's view that
employer motive is not an essential element in 8 (a) (1) cases.
III
AN INTERPRETATION: SEEKING ORDER IN DISORDER

How, then, can we justify the American Ship Building and Brown Food
equation of 8(a) (1) and (3) with respect to the hostile-motive requirement? At the risk of over-simplification, I intend to essay this task. The
Supreme Court's concern in American Ship Building and Brown Food
was presaged in its decision of 1960 in the Insurance Agents case.30 There
it held that the Board had wrongfully injected itself into the substantive
aspects of the collective bargaining between the employer and the union
by ruling the union's slowdown or on-the-job strike a per se violation of
the union's duty to bargain. The Act did not specifically outlaw slowdowns
or half-strikes. Therefore, depriving the union of this economic weapon
amounted to a tying of the union's hands with respect to free collective
bargaining. This tying-of-hands flew in the face of the national labor
policy favoring free collective bargaining, which entails the freedom of
bringing pressure to bear upon the other party so long as the pressure has
not been specifically outlawed. Similarly, in the lockout cases the Board
had interjected itself between the parties in their collective bargaining by
denying to the employers economic weapons not specifically barred by the
Act.
All of this makes sense since the national labor policy, as declared by
Congress, favors free collective bargaining. But the condition precedent to
such bargaining is that the employees of a given employer be free to
organize. Freedom to organize requires affirmative protection by the
28 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
29 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
30 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
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national government through the NLRB. What the right to organize must
be protected against is employer power. Once the employees are organized,
the right to bargain collectively does not require the same degree of
affirmative protection. Indeed, protection of the employees at the bargaining stage against the exercise of employer bargainingpower derogates
from the freedom of collective bargaining, since it entails a Board thumb
on the employee side of the bargaining scales. Of course, employer power
may be used even at the bargaining stage for union-destroying (i.e., antiorganization-right) purposes. For this reason, employer motive for the
exercise of power is a vital factor at the bargaining stage.
Viewed in this fashion, the protection which the Board should properly
extend to the employees qualitatively changes at the stage where the
employees have become organized and recognition has been accorded to
their union. The Board's involvement in the give-and-take of bargaining
should be less than its involvement in the setting and preserving of the
stage for collective bargaining.
Little disagreement is apt to be registered with this dichotomy between
the Board's proper role in protecting the right of self-organization and its
proper role in the bargaining process.3 1 Unfortunately, however, it is a
distinction more easily made in theory than in practice. Two obstacles
impede the application of the theory. The first is that the language of
section 8(a) (1) remains constant whatever the section 7 right involved.
If employer conduct devoid of hostile motive constitutes an "interference
with" the right of self-organization, as in Republic Aviation, by some sort
of balancing process conducted by the Board, why should not the same
statutory language permit the same balancing process where the right involved is that of bargaining collectively? The second obstacle is that all
cases do not fall neatly into the one category or the other. The lockout
cases, for example, reached the Court under sections 8(a) (1) and (3)
only, whereas what really was at issue were the rights and duties of the
parties in the process of collective bargaining. The fundamental 8(a) (5)
charges had been mooted by the execution of new contracts while the
32
cases were pending before the Board.
31 The distinction is expressly noted by the Court in American Ship Building:

The central purpose of these provisions [sections 8(a) (1) and (3)] was to protect
employee self-organization and the process of collective bargaining from disruptive interferences by employers. Having protected employee organization in countervailance
to the employers' bargaining power, and having established a system of collective bargaining whereby the newly coequal adversaries might resolve their disputes, the Act
also contemplated resort to economic weapons should more peaceful measures not avail.
Sections 8(a) (1) and (3) do not give the Board a general authority to assess the relative economic power of the adversaries in the bargaining process and to deny weapons
to one party or the other because of its assessment of that party's bargaining power.
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965).
32 Id. at 306 n.5. The Supreme Court made it quite clear in American Ship Building that'
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In the face of these two obstacles, what the Court has been striving to
develop is a formula which is flexible enough to facilitate a circumscribing of the Board's power where circumscription is in order. The old
balancing test was too loose a standard for accomplishing this in collective
bargaining situations. The Board could weigh the section 7 right of the
employees to engage in self-organization against the employer's right to
run his business, as in the "no-solicitation rule" cases, and achieve the
purposes of the Act, which are, most basically, to encourage collective
bargaining. But when the Board applied the same balancing test to collective bargaining pressures, as in the lockout cases, it thwarted collective
bargaining.
The new formula which the Court is evolving seeks to preserve what is
good in the balancing test, while weeding out what is bad. At the same
time, it seeks to accommodate prior decisions of the Court, premised upon
the balancing approach, by means of a new rationalization of the "true"
basis for such decisions. The new rationalization may entail two correlative theses. The first is that where sections 8(a) (1) and (3) overlap in
their application to a problem presented, the more particular criteria of
8(a) (3) control. 8(a)(3) is the dog, and 8(a)(1) the tail. The second is
that in cases where mere balancing produces an unsatisfactory result
because too invasive of free collective bargaining or of management prerogatives, independent evidence of a hostile motive on the part of the
employer is an essential ingredient of the unfair labor practice.
A. The Dog-and-Tail Thesis
In cases of overlap between sections 8(a) (1) and (3)-indeed, between
8(a) (1) and any other subdivision of 8(a)-there is strong reason for
equating the general provision with the particular. Otherwise, the particular is read out of the statute. If, for example, the elements of 8(a) (3)
properly include scienter, the same scienter must be required for 8(a) (1)
in cases of overlap. Otherwise, the reason justifying the requirement of
scienter in 8(a) (3) would be defeated; all prosecutions in such cases of
overlap would be under 8(a) (1), the requirements of which would be
satisfied by proof of the elements necessary under 8(a) (3) with the
exception of the scienter element. Having found the commission of an
unfair labor practice under 8(a) (1), the Board could grant the same
relief as under 8(a) (3), since the Court has scotched any notion that the
Board's remedial power under 8(a) (3) is greater than under 8(a) (1).
Burnup & Sims constitutes a square holding to this effect." The Board
its decision in favor of the employer would have been a fortiori under section 8(a) (5) by
reason of the Insurance Agents case, supra note 30. Ibid.
33 NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964). See also NLRB v. Walton Mfg.
Co., 369 U.S. 404 (1962).
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ordered the reinstatement of two discharged union activists on the basis of
findings of violations of both 8(a) (3) and (1). The Supreme Court upheld
the Board on the basis of 8(a) (1) alone, leaving the Board's remedial
order intact.
Burnup & Sims does present some problems for the dog-and-tail thesis,
but these can be reconciled, I believe, on the grounds that the wherewithal
for the dog-and-tail analysis had not been fully provided by the Supreme
Court until Darlington and the lockout cases, decided a year later, and
that the hostile-motive requirement of the 8(a) (3) dog is itself a flexible
requirement, subject to considerable judicial manipulation in appropriate
cases. Because of this flexibility, the decision in Burnup & Sims would
have been the same under 8(a) (3) as it was under 8(a) (1), as we shall
see shortly.
Darlingtonis particularly instructive on the dog-and-tail point. The
Board found the employer's closing of a plant in which a union had just
won a representation election to be a violation of 8(a) (1) and (3)." But
the Board's analysis of the closure question centered upon 8(a) (3), with
8(a) (1) thrown in as a tag-on, as it so frequently is. The Supreme Court,
as we have seen, reviewed the case on the basis of 8(a) (3) alone. In so
doing, however, the Court made it quite clear that its decision would have
been the same under 8(a) (1), through what may be characterized as an
application of the dog-and-tail principle. Mr. justice Harlan, writing for
the Court, stated:
A violation of § 8(a) (1) alone .

.

. presupposes an act which is unlawful

even absent a discriminatory motive. Whatever may be the limits of
§ 8(a) (1), some employer decisions are so peculiarly matters of management prerogative that they would never constitute violations of § 8 (a) (1),
whether or not they involved sound business judgment, unless they also
violated § 8(a) (3). Thus it is not questioned in this case that an employer
has the right to terminate his business, whatever the impact of such action
on concerted activities, if the decision to close is motivated by other than
discriminatory reasons. But such action, if discriminatorily motivated, is
encompassed within the literal language of § 8(a) (3). We therefore deal
with the Darlington closing under that section.85 [Emphasis added.]
Thus it would appear that the incipient dog-and-tail theory with respect
to 8(a) (3) and (1) is not confined in its potential to overlap cases where
a finding of violation is upheld under 8(a) (3), and where, as a consequence, the violation of 8 (a) (1) is established derivatively (one aspect of
the dog-and-tail analysis). The Board's 8(a) (3) determination was not
upheld in Darlington; instead, the case was ordered remanded to the
Board for further findings as to whether the purpose and effect of the
closing was to "chill unionism" in other plants of a multi-corporation
Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 252 (1962).
85 Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965).
34
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structure. Nor would it seem that the Board can control whether a given
case is to be reviewed under 8(a) (3) or 8(a) (1) by the choice it makes of
the section to proceed under. In Darlington, it proceeded under both
sections (although the finding under 8(a) (1) was apparently derivative),
but the remand was confined to 8(a) (3) and the "chilling unionism"
issues. If the Court had considered the 8(a) (1) question open to the
Board despite the overlap with 8(a) (3), it is reasonable to conclude that
its remand would have left the Board free to reconsider the case under
both sections.
The only conclusion fairly to be drawn from the Court's handling of the
Darlingtoncase is that at least in some situations of overlap between sections 8(a) (3) and (1) the Board must proceed under the more particular
provision, even if the Board's finding under 8(a) (3) turns out to be that
no violation was committed. The derivative implication of such a finding
would be that 8(a) (1) was not violated either. If this should be true in
any situation of overlap, strong argument can be made that it should be
true in all; important management prerogatives are at stake in all 8 (a) (3)
cases, in contrast to independent 8 (a) (1) cases.
A definitional problem exists, to be sure, in determining when "overlap"
is really present. Some cases will lie at the very periphery of 8(a) (3)'s
scope-perhaps within, perhaps without-while falling more clearly
within the broader compass of 8(a)(1). The question will arise as to
whether the criteria of 8(a) (3) or of 8(a) (1) ought to control in such
cases. But this is a problem of line-drawing, inherent in the law. Where
the determination is properly made that the criteria of 8(a) (3) are
applicable to a given case, strong reason exists to give those criteria preemptive force.
The logic which supports the equation of 8(a) (1) and (3) in areas of
overlap likewise supports the equating of 8(a)(1) and the other subdivisions of 8(a) in areas of overlap. Again, unless the particularlized
dogs of 8(a)(2), (4), and (5) wag the generalized tail of 8(a)(1), the
former will be read out of the statute. The Board will proceed along the
line of least resistance, and this will be 8(a)(1). In cases of overlap
between 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (5), for example, the state-of-mind requirement for an 8(a) (1) violation should be the same as that for 8(a) (5).16
Where there is no overlap, 8(a) (1) need not be chameleonic with
respect to the state-of-mind requirement, but instead should have an
independent coloration, determined by the character of the problem involved. The considerations pertinent to this proposition will be examined
in a later section.
36 See, e.g., Getman, supra note 23, at 758-59.
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The alternative to the dog-and-tail interpretation of the lockout cases is
that the Court has embarked upon an across-the-board equation of sections 8 (a) (1) and (3) with respect to the hostile-motive requirement, intending to apply the latter in independent 8(a) (1) cases as well as in cases
of overlap with 8 (a) (3). While the Court may, indeed, have started down
this path, there is reason to question the propriety of such a course. In
any event, the contours of the hostile-motive doctrine must be examined.
B. The Hostile-Motive Doctrine (With Escape Hatch)
In determining whether employer conduct constitutes a violation of
sections 8(a) (1) and (3), the Board has long engaged in weighing the
prejudice to the section 7 rights of the employees against any legitimate
business purpose sought to be served by the employer action. Where the
former has outweighed the latter, the Board has found unfair labor
practices to have been committed. This weighing process has been called
the "balancing test." It has received the approval of the Supreme Court in
7
a number of well-known decisionsY
At the same time, however, that the balancing approach was being
formulated and approved, a parallel development was taking place with
respect to section 8(a) (3). The motive of employer conduct which allegedly violated that section was coming under increasing scrutiny 8 The two
developments traveled a collision course.
The Radio Officers case"9 in 1954 provided the first occasion for the
Supreme Court to clarify in definitive fashion the requirements of 8 (a)
(3). The Court held that while it is essential for a violation of 8(a) (3)
that the employer's motive in discriminating against an employee be to
encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization, "specific evidence of intent to encourage or discourage is not an indispensable element
of proof ... ."'0 The Court explained:
Both the Board and the courts have recognized that proof of certain types
of discrimination satisfies the intent requirement. This recognition that
specific proof of intent is unnecessary where employer conduct inherently
encourages or discourages union membership is but an application of the
common-law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences
of his conduct.41
This formulation of the state-of-mind requirement for 8(a) (3), and
of the character of proof necessary to establish state-of-mind, was re37 E.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957)
("Buffalo Linen").
38 See, e.g., cases cited in note 20 supra.
39 Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
40 Id. at 44.
41

Id. at 45. [Footnote omitted.]
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endorsed at some length by the Court in 1963 in Erie Resistor, the superseniority case. However, the balancing power of the Board remained
viable. As stated in Erie Resistor, the necessary intent may be:
[F]ounded upon the inherently discriminatory or destructive nature of the
conduct itself. The employer in such cases must be held to intend the very
consequences which foreseeably and inescapably flow from his actions and
if he fails to explain away, to justify or to characterize his actions as something different than they appear on their face, an unfair labor practice
charge is made out. [Citing Radio Officers.] But, as often happens, the
employer may counter by claiming that his actions were taken in the pursuit
of legitimate business ends and that his dominant purpose was not to
discriminate or to invade union rights but to accomplish business objectives
acceptable under the Act. Nevertheless, his conduct does speak for itselfit is discriminatory and it does discourage union membership and whatever
the claimed overriding justification may be, it carries with it unavoidable
consequences which the employer not only foresaw but which he must have
intended. As is not uncommon in human experience, such situations present
a complex of motives and preferring one motive to another is in reality the

far more delicate task, reflected in part in decisions of this Court, of weighing the interests of employees in concerted activity against the interest of the
employer in operatinghis business in a particularmanner and of balancingin
the light of the Act and its policy the intended consequences upon employee rights against the business ends to be served by the employer's

conduct. This essentially is the teaching of the Court's prior cases dealing
42
with this problem and, in our view, the Board did not depart from it.

[Some emphasis added.]
Erie Resistor constitutes, then, an attempted reconciliation of the
hostile-motive requirement and the balancing test in 8(a) (3) cases. The
balancing process becomes a means for establishing motive, for "preferring one motive to another." Most sympathetically viewed, what this
seems to mean is that where there is no independent evidence of hostile
motive, the Board may infer the motive if the employer interest on the
scales is outweighed by the section 7 rights of the employees. Less sympathetically viewed, what is involved is the pinning of a fictitious hostilemotive label on the product of the balancing process. Whether one judges
this "reconciliation" to be a laborious exercise in judicial obfuscation or an
ingenious clarificaton, it set the stage for the "hostile-motive-doctrinewith-escape-hatch" which emerges, full blown, in the lockout cases.
1. Intent and Motive Distinguished
A slight digression may be in order at this point. A close reading of the
foregoing passage from Erie Resistor reveals a distinction between employer intent and motive which is frequently overlooked in the analysis of
42 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-30 (1963). [Footnote omitted.] The
words "does," "is," and "does" in the sentence beginning "Nevertheless" are italicized in the

original.
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section 8(a) (3). The two terms are often used interchangeably by the
Court (and others) in the 8(a) (3) context,48 or smudged together under
more generic rubrics, such as "scienter"'4 4 or "aimus."4 5 Clear analysis
requires that intent and motive be segregated with respect to 8(a) (3) in
view of the Court's reliance upon the "common-law rule that a man is
held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct," a reliance
first announced as to 8(a) (3) in Radio Officers4 6 and reiterated in Erie
4 7 and Brown Food.18
Resistor
This common-law rule applies most classically to cases such as this:
A points a gun which he knows to be loaded at a vital part of B's anatomy
and pulls the trigger, killing B. From this, without more, it may be presumed that A intended to kill B. However, it is open to A to seek to "explain away" or "justify" his act by showing, for example, that he shot in
self-defense. If A's motive was self-defense, then his intentional killing
of B is justified or privileged; A has committed no offense.4 9
Similarly, if an employer discharges an employee who is actively engaged in seeking to organize the employer's plant, the employer may be
presumed to intend to discourage union membership, since the latter follows not only foreseeably but, it would seem, inescapably from the employer's act, however much he might regret it, because of the loss of
union leadership and the fear and suspicion generated among his employees. However, if the real motive for the discharge is shown to be a
breach of shop rules by the employee, the discouragement of union membership is justified or privileged; the employer has committed no offense,
despite the unavoidable, and hence intended (pursuant to the commonlaw presumption), consequence of discouraging union membership.
If it be objected that the consequence of discouraging union membership does not flow utterly unavoidably from the employer's act, the
answer is that the same is true in the example of A's shooting of B; instances where shootings, which fit the description of the deadly-weapon
illustration above, do not eventuate in death are not uncommon. Nonetheless, the presumption (or inference) of the intent to achieve that which
almost invariably follows from one's volitional act is part and parcel of
the common-law rule the Court relies upon in seeking to bring harmony
43 See, e.g., Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, supra note 39, in which, under the heading
"Proof of Motive," the Court proceeds to discuss the "intent requirement." Id. at 44-45.
The two terms are loosely used throughout the two lockout cases of 1965.
44 See, e.g., ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 739 (1961).
45 See, e.g., NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 286 (1965).
46 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
47 See text accompanying note 42 supra.
48 NLRB v. Brown, supra note 45, at 287.
49 For a discussion of the common-law rule as applied to deadly weapons, see Oberer,
"The Deadly Weapon Doctrine-Common Law Origin," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1565 (1962).
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to its disparate precedents." Any artificiality involved is the Court's and
the common law's, not mine.
If the analogy to the common-law rule, as classically illustrated in the
deadly-weapon example, is to hold true, the burden should fall upon the
employer at least to raise the issue of his justifying motive by the presentation of supporting evidence. 51 Otherwise the trier of fact (the Board)
is entitled to find against him on the basis of what is at minimum a prima
facie case. Of course, employer justification may appear on the very face
of the action he has taken. Indeed, this was the situation in the lockout
cases, the justifiable employer motive being the utilization of bargaining
pressures not specifically made unlawful by the statute. In such situations, the prima facie case is not made out, and the burden of countering
the apparent justification, via independent evidence of hostile motive, is
upon the "prosecution."
The foregoing discussion may make clearer the relation between intent
and motive in 8(a) (3) cases. It may also demonstrate that what is really
required to be present for a violation to be found under the evolving
scienter doctrine is an employer purpose to undercut section 7 rights,
rather than to serve legitimate employer interests. This "purpose" need
not be demonstrated by independent evidence in all cases. Where it need
not be so demonstrated, it is necessarily the product of inference or presumption-if, indeed, it is not a mere fictitious requirement, introduced
in an effort to reconcile prior decisions, based upon the old balancing test
where employer purpose was not in issue, with the emerging hostile-motive requirement. This requirement of a wrongful employer "purpose" is
more accurately described in terms of "motive" than "intent," for reasons
already stated.
2. The "Escape Hatch": The Balancing Test Redefined
Be this as it may, the "state-of-mind" requirement of 8(a) (3), as the
Court reaffirms in the lockout cases, does not require specific evidence in
all cases. In some cases, the very character of the employer's conduct
50 Ibid. The distinction between "presumption" and "inference" in the application of the
rule is discussed id. at 1573-76.
51 Two different varieties of motive are asserted by employers in defense against 8(a) (3)
charges, as Professor Getman has pointed out, and the failure of the courts to distinguish
between them has been the source of "long-standing confusion":
The typical 8(a) (3) case involves the discharge or discipline of an employee active in
union activities. The employer defends on the grounds that the discharge was not based
on union activity, but on poor work or misconduct. In the second type of case the employer seeks to defend action admittedly taken in response to union activity on the
grounds that it was intended to serve a proper business purpose.
Getman, supra note 23, at 743. The first variety of motive defense has always been recognized and is clearly legitimate. The second is less persuasive and raises delicate balancing
problems.
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will carry "its own indicia of improper intent.""2 As I read the lockout
cases, employer conduct will carry such indicia in two situations: (1)
where the employer has no significant legitimate business reason for actions which undercut the section 7 rights of his employees; (2) where the
employer does have a significant business purpose, but his actions, nevertheless, are so destructive of employee rights as not to be "tolerated consistently with the Act."" While my interpretation is by no means selfevident from a reading of the opinions,5 4 it is supported by the most
tenable statement of the evolving doctrine to be found in the lockout
cases. As formulated by Mr. Justice Brennan in Brown Food:
When the resulting harm to employee rights is thus comparatively slight,
and a substantial and legitimate business end is served, the employers' conduct is prima facie lawful. Under these circumstances the finding of an
unfair labor practice under § 8(a) (3) requires a showing of improper
subjective intent.5 5 [Emphasis added.]
Moreover, my interpretation serves to accommodate Republic Aviation
and Erie Resistor, both treated by the Court as still alive and kicking.56
Republic Aviation qualifies under the first exception to the requirement
of independent evidence; Erie Resistor qualifies under the second.
One way of describing what the Court has done in the lockout decisions, then, is to say that it has merely redefined the balancing test.5"
The purpose of the balancing is to ascertain whether independent evidence of hostile motive is necessary. If, weighing the interest served by
the employer conduct against the harm done to employee rights, the employee interest is much weightier, there is an unfair labor practice, without more. In such a situation it may be said that an inference of hostile
motive is supported by the evidence. The new definition requires, simply,
that the scales be more out of balance than was necessary under the old
balancing test, sufficiently so that an inference of hostile motive is more
solidly based. The requisite basis should exist in the two situations previously delineated. In the first, it is more reasonable to infer a wrongful
52 NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965).
53 Id. at 286.
54 For a fuller discussion of this problem of interpretation, see Oberer, supra note 13, at 214.
55 NLRB v. Brown, supra note 52, at 289. But see Mr. justice Stewart's extreme and
contrary view, writing for the Court in American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300,
309 (1965):
Nor is the lockout one of those acts which is demonstrably so destructive of collective
bargaining that the Board need not inquire into employer motivation, as -might be the
case, for example, if an employer permanently discharged his unionized staff and replaced them with employees known to be possessed of a violent antiunion animus. [Emphasis added.]
56 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 & n.10
(1965); NLRB v. Brown, supra note 52, at 283, 287, 288, 291 & n.5; American Ship Bldg.
Co. v. NLRB, supra note 55, at 309, 312.
57 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Oberer, supra note 13, at 212-15.
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employer purpose than a purpose to serve an insignificant employer interest; nothing of significance in the way of justification appears on the
employer's side of the scales. In the second, the employer interest served,
while significant, is not adequate to justify an action "inherently destructive of" employee interests. Erie Resistor is the prime example here. As
explained in Brown Food:
The only reasonable inference that could be drawn by the Board from the
award of superseniority-balancing the prejudicial effect upon the employees against any asserted business purpose-was that it was directed
against the striking employees because of their union membership; conduct
so inherently destructive of employee interests could not be saved from
illegality by an asserted overriding business purpose pursued in good
faith. 58 [Emphasis added.]
3. Squaring the New Test With Precedent
A question arises as to whether this new balancing test or hostilemotive-doctrine-with-escape-hatch applies not only to 8(a) (3) cases and
to 8(a) (1) charges which fall in the area of "overlap" with 8(a) (3), but
also to independent 8(a) (1) cases. Since the 8(a) (1) charges involved in
the lockout cases were of the overlap variety, the holding of the Court,
narrowly interpreted, reaches only overlapping 8 (a) (1) cases.
But even if a broader interpretation of the lockout cases is indulged,
so as to extend their reach to independent 8(a) (1) violations, there still
is a substantial enough "escape hatch" for the Board to be able to reach
the same employer conduct it has traditionally proscribed under 8 (a) (1).
One way of verifying this conclusion is to examine the cases cited by
Justices Goldberg and White in their separate opinions in the lockout
cases as being in conflict with the hostile-motive requirement. Representative of their position is the following quote from Mr. Justice Goldberg's
concurrence in American Ship Building:
The Court states that employer conduct, not actually motivated by antiunion bias, does not violate § 8(a) (1) or § 8(a) (3) unless it is "demonstrably so destructive of collective bargaining" . . . or "so prejudicial to
union interests and so devoid of significant economic justification," . . .
that no antiunion animus need be shown. This rule departs substantially
from both the letter and the spirit of numerous prior decisions of the Court.
[Citing Buffalo Linen, Republic Aviation, Babcock & Wilcox, and Burnup
& Sims.]
These decisions demonstrate that the correct test for determining whether
§ 8(a) (1) has been violated in cases not involving an employer antiunion
motive is whether the business justification for the employer's action outweighs the interference with § 7 rights involved. In Republic Aviation...'
for example, the Court affirmed a Board holding that a company "no-solicitation" rule was invalid as applied to prevent solicitation of employees on
58

NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965).
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company property during periods when employees were free to do as they
pleased, not because such a rule was "demonstrably . . . destructive of

collective bargaining," but simply because there was no significant employer justification for the rule and there was a showing of union interest,

though far short of a necessity, in its abolition....
A similar test is applicable in § 8(a) (3) cases where no antiunion motive
is shown. [Citing Radio Officers and Erie Resistor.]r9
While the force of Mr. Justice Goldberg's position must be conceded,
it would appear that none of the cases cited by him in opposition to the
Court's hostile-motive doctrine, as declared in the lockout cases, need be
decided any differently under that doctrine, however different the rationalization might have to be. The Board's decision in Buffalo Linen 0 in
favor of the locking-out employers was upheld by the Court on the basis
of the Board's balancing power. This decision would be a fortiori under
the hostile-motive test.
Republic Aviation would fall within the exception to the requirement of independent evidence of hostile motive since no significant business justification was shown for a rule barring union solicitation during
non-work time. Accordingly, the only reasonable inference to be drawn
is one of hostile motive on the part of the employer, despite the fact that
the rule was not discriminatorily applied against union solicitation.
Babcock & Wilcox,61 in which the Court concluded that the Board had
incorrectly found the section 7 rights of the employees to outweigh the
employer's rights where union solicitation by non-employees on employer
property was involved, would also be an -a fortiori case under the hostilemotive doctrine. If a showing were to be made, as it was not, that other
channels of communication between the non-employee organizers and the
employees they sought to reach were not reasonably available, the decision should go the other way under either the old balancing doctrine
or the new one with the hostile-motive facade.
Burnup & Sims, 62 the case presenting the most obvious difficulty under
the hostile-motive doctrine, can be reconciled on the basis that firing'
union leaders on the ground of a mistaken belief that they have been
guilty of dischargeable offenses is "demonstrably so destructive of employee rights and so devoid of significant service to any legitimate business end that it cannot be tolerated consistently with the Act.163 The case
therefore qualifies for the escape hatch formulated in the lockout cases.
In the first place, a mistaken belief (particularly one based upon hear59 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 55, at 339-40. [Footnote omitted.]
60 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
61 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
62 NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964).
63 NLRB v. Brown, supra note 58, at 286.
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say) is not a "significant" employer justification. Secondly, to treat such
a mistake as an adequate ground for retaliation by the employer would
subject the discharged employees to the ultimate penalty for activities
rooted in section 7, and would also open the door to spurious claims of
"mistake," difficult to disprove and "inherently destructive of" employee
rights. In other words, the requirement of independent evidence of hostile
motive should not be carried to a degree so destructive of section 7 rights.
The same rationale is applicable to Radio Officers and Erie Resistor,
both of which are cases to which the hostile-motive doctrine was applied
by the Court and found satisfied.
4. Summary
In summary, then, the hostile-motive doctrine is the product of section
8(a) (3), not 8(a)(1). Even as to 8(a)(3), the doctrine should permit
the Board to find a violation, without the support of specific evidence of
hostile purpose, in any case where either (1) no significant legitimate
business purpose appears for employer action which undercuts section 7
rights, or (2) in any event, the employer action is "inherently" or "demonstrably" "destructive of" section 7 rights. In these two situations, the
purpose of the employer to discourage or encourage union membership
(and, therefore, derivatively to "interfere with" section 7 rights) is presumed.
IV
INDEPENDENT

8 (a) (1)

VIOLATIONS

The propriety of extending the hostile-motive doctrine in mechanical
fashion to all section 8 (a) (1) cases, in the interests of symmetry and ease
of review, is subject to question. What is right for section 8(a)(3) is
not necessarily right for section 8(a) (1). The legislative history would
seem to make this clear, as would the very language of 8(a) (1). What
that section proscribes is "interference with, restraint, or coercion of"
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them under section
7. In contrast to section 8(a)(3), no hint of a scienter requirement is
present here. As stated by the Supreme Court in the InternationalLadies'
Garment Workers case in 1961: "We find nothing in the statutory langnage prescribing scienter as an element of the unfair labor practices
[8(a) (1) and (2)] here involved."64 Burnup & Sims, as previously seen,
is to the same express effect.
This is not to say that motive is, or should be deemed, irrelevant in all
8(a) (1) cases. It is clearly relevant where it operates, for example, to
64 ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 739 (1961).
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deprive an employer of a privilege he would otherwise have to interfere
with section 7 activities, as in the case of an apparently valid no-solicitation rule which is vitiated by evidence of an antiunion purpose in its
promulgation or application.6 5 Moreover, as we have seen, where 8 (a) (1)
overlaps with 8(a) (3), the scienter requirement of the latter should exist
also for the former, on the dog-and-tail analysis. Similarly, in those independent 8(a) (1) cases which analogize closely to 8(a) (3), the motive
apparatus of 8(a) (3), replete with "escape hatch," becomes relevant,
usually because discharges or related disciplinary action is involved and
a significant management prerogative therefore at stake.
For example, where the employer discharges employees for engaging
in protected concerted activities which are unrelated to any union or
unionizing effort, it is hard to make out an 8(a) (3) case. Discrimination
is clearly present, but the added requirement of encouraging or discouraging union "membership," which includes union activities,66 is apparently
not involved, no union being on the scene. The case must therefore be
dealt with under 8(a) (1) alone. Frequently, no serious problem of motive is present in such a case; the crucial question is whether the activity
is protected. An example is Washington Aluminum,67 where a group of
unorganized employees engaged in a concerted refusal to work during a
cold spell because the employer was not supplying enough heat. In upholding the Board's finding of an 8(a) (1) violation, the Supreme Court
summarily rejected the employer's contention that:
[B]ecause it admittedly had an established plant rule which forbade
employees to leave their work without permission of the foreman, there
was justifiable "cause" [under section 10(c)] for discharging these employees, wholly separate and apart from any concerted activities in which
they engaged in protest against the poorly heated plant.68
No express motive analysis was indulged by the Court, although the consideration and rejection of the employer's contention that the discharges
65 See, e.g., Wm. H. Block Co., 150 NL..R.B. 341 (1964). The proposition is broadly
stated in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227 (1963):
When specific evidence of a subjective intent to discriminate or to encourage or discourage union membership is shown, and found, many otherwise innocent or ambiguous
actions which are normally incident to the conduct of a business may, without more, be
converted into unfair labor practices.
66 See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937); Radio Officers' Union
v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1954) ; American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 313

(1965).

67 NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). See also NLRB v. Local 1229,
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953) ("Jefferson Standard"), a particularly

interesting case because of the play between §§ 8(a) (1) and (3) evidenced in its history. The
Trial Examiner and Board dealt with the case under both 8(a) (1) and (3), 94 N.L.R.B.

1507, 1508-12 (1951), as did the D.C. Circuit, 202 F.2d 186, n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1952), union
activities being involved. But as the case was presented to the Supreme Court, it was
premised on 8(a) (1) alone, for reasons not specified in the Court's opinion.
68 NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., supra note 67, at 16.
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were for "cause" under section 10(c)' 9 entailed substantially the same
analytical process. Obviously, the failure of the employees to obtain their
foreman's permission to engage in a concerted work stoppage could not
be deemed a justifiable "cause" for discharge, because of the implicit
destruction of the right to strike. Similarly, it could not be deemed a
justifiable "motive" for discharge. Whether a case like Washington
Aluminum is analyzed in terms of the "cause" provision of section 10(c)
or the hostile-motive doctrine of 8(a) (3), the result is thus the same.
While the "cause" or "motive" question was easily answered in Washington Aluminum, it may be presented in more difficult fashion in related
situations. The employer may claim one of two justifications for the discharges: (1) that the discharges were for some cause unrelated to the
protected concerted activity, such ,as incompetence; (2) that the discharges were for the very reason of engaging in the protected activity but
under circumstances which should privilege the termination of employment. An example of the latter type of justification is the Redwing Carriers case. 70 There, the employer discharged and replaced teamsters who
refused to cross a picket line set up by the Chemical Workers Union at
a customer's plant. The Board found the employees' concerted refusal
to be a protected activity under section 7, but, nonetheless, held that, in
the absence of evidence of antiunion animus, the employer's action was
privileged as a means of continuing the interrupted business relationship. 7' Accordingly, section 8 (a) (1) was not violated, by analogy to Mackay Radio.72 The Supreme Court denied the petition of the Teamsters
Union, on behalf of the dismissed employees, for certiorari. 7 3
This case, however, and others like it, would seem to fall, with little
prodding, in the area of overlap with section 8(a) (3) and to be subject,
69 The Labor-Management Relations Act § 10(c), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1964), provides in pertinent part: "No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement
of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to
him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause."
70 Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961), on remand, 137 N.L.R.B. 1545
(1962), aff'd sub nom. Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
71 In its original decision, the Board found the concerted refusal to cross the picket line
to be an unprotected activity under § 7, relying upon its prior decision in Auto Parts Co.,
107 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953), an 8(a) (3) case. 130 N.L.R.B. at 1211. On reconsideration after
remand from the D.C. Court of Appeals (on the Board's uncontested motion), the Board
held that the activity was protected, but that, nonetheless, the employer was privileged to
attempt to run its business "despite the sympathetic activities of the drivers here involved."
137 N.L.R.B. at 1547 (citing and relying upon NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S.
333 (1938)). In so holding, the Board abandoned the distinction it had previously drawn in
such cases between "replacement" and "discharge," quoting the Supreme Court's characterization of that distinction "in this context ... as unrealistic and unfounded in law" in NLRB
v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 75 (1953). 137 N.L.R.B. at 1547-48.
72 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., supra note 71.
73 See note 70 supra.
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therefore, to hostile-motive analysis on the dog-and-tail principle. 74 Discharge of employees for engaging in concerted union activities is surely
discriminatory and, absent a justifying motive, would be presumed to be
for the purpose of discouraging such activities. Had the discharged drivers
in Redwing Carrierscontended (as they apparently did not) that they
had refused to cross another union's picket line because of their own
union principles, section 8(a) (3) Would seem to have been squarely involved. As the case is reported, the degree of involvement, if any, of the
Teamsters Union in the refusal to cross the Chemical Workers' picket
line does not appear. 5 The reason which was advanced for the refusal to
cross was the fear of the drivers that physical harm would befall them at
the hands of the picketers, and refuge was sought in section 502's "abnormally dangerous conditions of work" provision, which made their
concerted refusal, they contended, not a strike.7 6 The Board rejected this
contention on the ground that other Redwing drivers had crossed the

77
picket line with impunity "about 3,600 times.1

An examination of other categories of independent 8(a)(1) violations demonstrates little function for a hostile-motive gloss, other than
to muddy-up waters which are now relatively clear and to render it a
bit more difficult for the Board to protect the most fundamental section 7
right of self-organization.
The Fourteenth Annual Report of the Board, covering the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1949, presents a representative, if not exhaustive, catalogue of independent 8(a) (1) violations:
[S]urveillance of union activities; interrogation of employees concerning
their membership in, or activities on behalf of a labor organization; polling
employees with respect to their union views; threatening economic or
physical reprisal for union activity; promising or granting wage increases
74 The Auto Parts case, supra note 71, on which the Board relied in its original Redwing
Carriers decision, was dealt with under 8(a) (3). Moreover, in Sherry Mfg. Co., 128 N.LR.B.
739 (1960), a case much like Washington Aluminum except that excessive heat instead of
excessive cold prompted the concerted protected activity, the Trial Examiner found a violation of 8(a)(3). The Board, however, found an independent 8(a)(1) violation, stating:
"unlike the Trial Examiner, we do not find Ramos' discharge to be a violation of Section
8(a) (3) of the Act. Ramos' action [in protesting the excessive heat] ... was not related to
union activities of any sort [the plant was unorganized], and, in the circumstances, her discharge, we find, in no way encouraged or discouraged membership in a labor organization."

Id. at 740.
See also the history of the "Jefferson Standard" case in note 67 supra.
75 The Board did, however, characterize the discharged drivers' refusal to cross the picket
line as "sympathetic activities." Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1547 (1962).
76 The Labor-Management Relations Act § 502, 61 Stat. 162 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 143
(1964), includes the following provision: "nor shall the quitting of labor by an employee or
employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of
employment of such employee or employees be deemed a strike under this Act."
77 Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208, 1211. This fact would seem to demonstrate
that the refusal of the discharged drivers to cross the picket line was, indeed, motivated by
union considerations. Thus it is arguable that 8(a) (3) applies.
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or other benefits to discourage union or other concerted activity; assaulting
union supporters or organizers; blacklisting employees because of their
union affiliations; assisting in the circulation of antiunion petitions; promoting resignations from a union or the withdrawal of a union's bargaining
authority; attempting to deal individually with strikers in disregard of their
duly designated exclusive bargaining agent; interfering with the attendance
of employees at union meetings by rearranging work schedules or similar
favored treatment to antiunion employees or to one
devices; and extending
78
of two rival unions.
The Annual Report for the fiscal year ending in 1965 contains only two
significant types of employer conduct not present in the foregoing independent 8(a) (1) catalogue: discharges for engaging in concerted activities protected under section 7, and no-solicitation-rule cases.79
A review of this 8(a) (1) catalogue demonstrates that, with few exceptions, what 8(a) (1) protects independently is the right to organize, free
of employer "interference, restraint, or coercion." Since this right is the

bedrock of the national labor policy, it merits particularly sensitive protection by the Board. Moreover, little in the way of legitimate management prerogative is ordinarily at stake in such cases, in contrast to cases
falling within section 8(a)(3) or (5).

Some of the "independent" 8(a) (1) categories listed in the foregoing
catalogue would seem to entail overlap with section 8(a) (3) and to be
subject to hostile-motive analysis, anyway, on the dog-and-tail basise.g., extending favored treatment to antiunion employees or to one of
two rival unions; promising or granting wage increases or other benefits
to discourage union activity."
78

14 NLRB Ann. Rep. 50-52 (1949).

79 30 NLRB Ann. Rep. 56-62 (1965).

80 Whether the promising or granting of wage increases or other benefits to discourage
union activity is properly to be dealt with under 8(a) (3) depends upon whether "discrimination" may be said to be involved. Clearly the other requisite for an 8(a) (3) violationdiscouragement of union membership or activities-is present. By analogy to the lockout
cases (Buffalo Linen, American Ship Building, Brown Food), the requisite element of discrimination would seem to be present. In those cases the discrimination requirement of 8(a)
(3) is deemed to be satisfied if the employer acts for the purpose of discouraging union
activities. Proof of the latter purpose satisfies also the discrimination requirement, despite
the fact that the entire work force is treated in the same fashion. Why is it not, then, also
discriminatory to grant a wage increase to an entire work force where the motive for doing
so is shown to be to discourage union membership? On the discrimination point, both situations would seem to be the same: all of the employees are discriminated against in the sense
that they are treated differently from the way in which they would be treated if it were
not for their union activities.
This equation of discrimination with discouragement "denies any separate meaning to the
former .... Discrimination as thus used includes any employer action taken in response to
union activity." Getman, "Section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA and the Effort To Insulate Free
Employee Choice," 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 735, 737 (1965). The author discusses other cases in
which the same general "discrimination" has been held to satisfy the requirements of 8(a) (3)
and concludes that:
The policy of insulating employees' jobs from their union activity or membership usually
applies with as much force to cases of general retaliation as to cases in which the employer singles out those who engaged in union activity for special treatment.
Id. at 738.
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Another category entails overlap with section 8(a) (5): attempting to
deal individually with strikers in disregard of their duly designated exclusive bargaining agent.8
The balance of the categories of independent 8(a) (1) violations, not
yet discussed, fall into two groupings: (1) threats of economic or physical reprisals; assaults; blacklisting; promoting antiunion petitions and
resignations; (2) surveillance; interrogation; polling; no-solicitationrule cases. The categories in the first of these groupings carry antistatutory hostility on their faces; requiring a hostile motive as to them would
accomplish nothing. The real problem area, then, if the hostile-motive doctrine is extended to independent 8 (a) (1) cases, is the second grouping.
Legitimate employer interest in the latter situations is so slight, and
illegitimate employer interest so strong, as to deny any valid function to
a hostile-motive requirement here. The old balancing-of-conflicting-legitimate-interests test has worked reasonably well in such cases. What that
test amounts to is the rule of reason. It affords adequate protection to the
employer interests on the scales and has the virtue of relative simplicity.
No need exists for the engrafting of a hostile-motive requirement, the
real purpose of which is to circumscribe Board power; if the Board finds
the employer conduct to be violative, the remedy is merely a cease and
desist order which protects the section 7 right with minimal invasion of
any legitimate employer interest." Typically, where the employer conduct reaches the stage of discharge or related disciplinary action, section
8(a) (3), with its prerogative-protecting motive paraphernalia, becomes
involved.
Indeed, because of this minimal impact upon management prerogatives, even if the hostile-motive doctrine is extended to such independent
8(a) (1) cases, they should fall in the escape-hatch area where no independent evidence of hostility is required. This is another way of saying
that the doctrine, soundly applied, would have no function here, other
than to obscure analysis and lengthen opinions. Unsoundly applied, it
81 With respect to 8(a) (5) (also 8(a) (2) and 8(a) (3)) overlaps with 8(a)(1), see id. at
758-61.

The cases could be most easily harmonized and future developments made more rational

if the rule were adopted that employer conduct affecting a change in hire, wages or work-

ig conditions, in response to union activity, does not violate section 8(a)(1) if it does
not violate section 8(a) (3) or section 8(a) (5).
Id. at 761.
82 This distinction between the impact on the employer of a cease and desist order and
an order to reinstate with back pay is reminiscent of the Fifth Circuit's old "Tex-O-Kan"

rule (NLRB v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co., 122 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1941)), rejected by the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404 (1962). The basis of the Court's

rejection was that "there is no place in the statutory scheme for one test of the substantiality
of evidence in reinstatement cases and another test in other cases." Id. at 407. This concern

should not be present where the issue involved is the proper interpretation to be given to

the language of § 8(a) (1) as distinguished from the different language of § 8(a) (3).
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would have a most mischievous potential, endangering the protection traditionally accorded the seminal right of self-organization.
In summary, then, while motive is relevant in some independent 8(a)
(1) cases, hostility to employee rights should not be a required element
in all such cases. Perhaps the simplest and safest way to deal with motive
in independent 8(a) (1) cases is to treat it as presumptively irrelevant,in
contrast to 8(a) (3) cases and overlapping 8(a) (1) cases where it may
be said to be presumptively relevant. If this approach were adopted, the
extension of the hostile-motive doctrine, so modified, to independent 8 (a)
(1) cases would be subject to little objection. The Board, courts, labor
bar, employers, and unions would know where they stand, since the traditional handling of such cases would be reaffirmed. No necessity would
arise for a tortured "accommodation" of precedents, such as Republic
Aviation, on the basis of a dubious inference or presumption of hostile employer purpose.
CONCLUSION

The hostile-motive doctrine is the product of section 8(a) (3), as to
which it makes some sense. Application of the doctrine to overlapping
8(a) (1) cases makes sense also, since the alternative is to read 8(a) (3)
out of the statute. On the basis of the legislative history of section 8(a)
(1) and a textual reading of its language, the generic engrafting of the
hostile-motive requirement on independent 8(a) (1) charges does not
make sense. The purpose of the hostile-motive requirement is two-fold:
(1) to protect the employer's prerogative "to select, discharge, lay-off,
transfer, promote, or demote his employees for any reasons other than
those proscribed by the act;"" (2) to keep the Board's thumb off the
bargaining scales in order to preserve free collective bargaining. Neither
of these purposes is typically served with respect to truly independent
8(a) (1) charges. The latter entail, most saliently, employer interference
with the right of self-organization, a right which must be affirmatively
protected if the national labor policy in favor of collective bargaining is
to be effectuated, and which can be so protected with no significant sacrifice of legitimate employer interests.
Withal, extension of the hostile-motive doctrine to independent 8(a)
(1) cases, pursuant to an interpretation of the lockout decisions which
gives the doctrine generic 8(a) (1) application, need have no substantial
effect upon existing Board policy if proper play is judicially afforded to
the "escape hatch" of the doctrine. If a re-rationalization by the Board
in such cases is the sole cost for circumscribing the Board's power to place
83

14 NLRB Ann. Rep. 59 (1949).
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a thumb on the bargaining scales in situations akin to the lockout cases,
and for protecting significant management prerogatives in 8 (a) (3) cases
where 8(a) (1) has merely redundant applicability, as in Darlington,the
Supreme Court's price is not too steep to pay. But mere symmetry is
hardly a compelling reason for extending a cumbersome doctrine developed for other cases and purposes to cases where it serves no legitimate
function-where, indeed, it may do violence to legislative intent, statutory language, substantial precedent, and clarity of analysis. Both symmetry and sense might, however, be served by application of the doctrine
to independent 8(a) (1) cases in a form so modified as to treat motive as
presumptively irrelevant in such cases, in contrast to 8(a)(3) and overlapping 8(a) (1) cases where it may be said to be presumptively relevant.
This approach would assure an expansive application of the "escape
hatch" in independent 8(a) (1) cases and a consequent confinement of
the requirement of specific evidence of hostile motive in such cases to the
relatively few situations where significant employer prerogatives are
involved.
In any event, the Court has still before it the problem of coming explicitly to grips'with the scope of 8(a) (1), as related to 8(a) (3), in the
light of the legislative history. The Board, invited by the ambiguity which
presently enshrouds the scope of 8(a) (1), as compared to 8 (a) (3), will
likely afford the Court the opportunity to provide this clarification.

